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INTRODUCTION 
 
Various national and international agencies are 
looking into the issues of space debris and space 
traffic management today. The United States (U.S.) 
Congress passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act in November 2015 (the “Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act”), which among other 
things, ordered a study seeking “[r]ecommendations 
related to the appropriate framework for the 
protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the 
public and economic vitality of the space industry.” 
[1]  
 
In response to this request, the Science Applications 
International Corporation delivered the Orbital 
Traffic Management Study Final Report to NASA on 
November 21, 2016 (the “Traffic Management 
Study”). Section 839, Orbital Debris, of the NASA 
Transition Authorization Act of 2017, S.442, 3 Jan 
2017 reads: "Congress finds that orbital debris poses 
serious risks to the operational space capabilities of 
the U. S.; an international commitment and integrated 
strategic plan are needed to mitigate the growth of 
orbital debris wherever possible…” 
 
Of course, space debris is a global issue that must be 
addressed globally. Of the approximately 23,000 
catalogued space objects (greater than 10cm), only 
6% are operational and only 1.7% are U.S. 
commercial spacecraft. [2] Internationally, the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) issued draft guidelines for the long-term 
sustainability of outer space activities in October 
2016, [3] which were discussed in depth at the 
February 2017 meeting of COPUOS in Vienna. The 
European Space Agency held its 7
th
 European 
Conference on Space Debris from April 18-21, 2017 
where much of the focus was on constellations and 
how the constellation operators should be regulated 
relative to “typical” space operators. Many countries 
are grappling with whether, when, and how to 
address orbital debris concerns such as debris 
mitigation and debris remediation whose importance 
are both accentuated when considering the 
deployment of large constellations. 
 
In short, this is a very critical time with respect to 
orbital debris issues. A time during which the 
regulations that govern satellite operations for the 
next 10-20 years will be promulgated. We agree with 
the Traffic Management Study that “[i]t is of critical 
importance that any policy adopted and any rules, 
regulations, standards, and operational requirements 
established are firmly based on physics, technical 
considerations, and operational limitations and 
timelines….” and that “[p]olicies and operational 
requirements that are not sufficiently based on 
informed physics and technical considerations will no 
doubt create economic consequences, while 
potentially not mitigating safety risks significantly.” 
[4]  
 
We hope that this paper provides a broad and 
balanced perspective for thinking about the “wide 
spectrum of risks” posed by and to constellation 
operators. This, in turn, should help inform carefully 
considered rules and regulations that mitigate 
practical orbital debris concerns, while not stifling 
the economic vitality of the satellite industry.  
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Many large constellations are being considered for deployment over the next ten years into low earth orbit (LEO). This paper 
seeks to quantify the risks that these constellations pose to the debris environment, the risks that the debris environment poses 
to these constellations, and the risks that these constellations pose to themselves.  
 
The three representative constellations examined in detail in this paper are operated (or planned to be operated) by Spire 
Global, Iridium, and OneWeb.  
 
This paper provides a balanced risk analysis including collision risk, operational risk, and non-adherence risk. For 
perspective, the risk posed by these economically useful constellations is compared to the risk associated with existing 
abandoned hardware deposited in clusters. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
This paper evaluates a range of risks including 
collision, operational, and non-adherence risks. This 
paper does not just focus on the risk of a constellation 
to the environment, but also seeks to provide an 
assessment of the potential hazard of the LEO 
environment on the constellation in question and also 
of the constellation in question on itself (i.e., 
fratricide). 
 
We conduct this balanced risk analysis on three 
representative constellations over the next 10-20 
years; anything beyond that has growing 
uncertainties from practical (i.e., new technologies 
available), financial (i.e., changing economic market 
conditions), and physical (i.e., different solar cycles) 
perspectives. Longer term predictions will lack the 
needed reliability and accuracy to be actionable. It is 
important to complete an analysis that is relevant to 
current rule making, operational tradeoffs, and debris 
mitigation activities and not just producing academic, 
non-actionable long-term observations. 
 
The three representative constellations analyzed in 
this paper are Iridium’s legacy constellation, 
OneWeb’s planned Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) 
constellation, and Spire Global’s current LEMUR-2 
constellation. These constellations, in the aggregate, 
provide a representative sample of the types of 
satellites to be deployed into LEO over the next 10-
20 years.  
 
First, Iridium has been operating for 20 years 
providing an historical record of a LEO operator and 
the risks that constellation operation poses to, and 
faces from, the debris environment and itself. It has 
station keeping capabilities, inhabits a relatively 
spatially dense orbit (~780km), is moderate in mass 
(~40,000 kg in aggregate), is moderate in areal cross-
section (~300m
2
 in aggregate), and is less numerous 
(72 satellites) compared to many proposed 
constellations. It is also representative of Iridium 
NEXT, the replacement constellation being launched 
over the next few years that will be around for 
another approximately 20 years.   
 
Constellation management for Iridium is eased by 
having all satellites with similar orbital periods and 
altitudes. Looking at the publically-available Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) satellite catalog, 
the “thickness” of the operational constellation (i.e., 
altitude span) is only 6km (773-779km). 
 
Second, OneWeb proposes a large FSS comprising 
720 satellites [5] in a high LEO (1200km) orbit that 
typifies the large FSS constellations proposed by 
other operators such as SpaceX, Boeing, and Telesat. 
Like Iridium, OneWeb will have station keeping but 
has selected a relatively sparsely populated orbit 
(~1200km), is high in mass (~108,000kg in 
aggregate), high in areal cross-section (~2,500m
2
 in 
aggregate), and it will be much more numerous than 
Iridium (~720 vs ~72 satellites). OneWeb is quite 
relevant as it, along with similar planned FSS 
constellations, is being launched and will operate 
over the next 10-20 years. It is assumed that OneWeb 
will have a much larger “thickness” than Iridium 
based on its FCC filing. The constellation was said to 
be contained within 1% of its semi-major axis, so 
±75km for a total width of 150km centered at 
1200km. 
 
Third is Spire Global’s LEMUR-2 constellation. 
Spire Global is in the process of deploying a 175-
satellite constellation in the 400-600km altitude range 
comprised of 3U CubeSats. 3U CubeSats typify the 
most common type of small satellite being launched 
today and which are expected to be launched over the 
coming years. [7] Over the next seven years, 
SpaceWorks estimates 2,400 nano/microsatellites 
will require launch or 342 per year on average. [6] 
However, estimates based on 15 year license terms 
and/or aspirational operator plans tend to be very 
optimistic. 
 
For instance, SpaceWorks’s original 2016 
Nano/Microsatellite Forecast of 210 satellites 
estimated to be launched in 2016 was off by nearly 
50% with only 101 nano/microsatellites actually 
launched. [8] LEMUR-2s will deploy to relatively 
less spatially dense orbits of 400-600km, are low in 
mass (875kg in aggregate), low in surface area (16m
2
 
in aggregate), and will lack station keeping. Spire, as 
more of an ad hoc constellation, will naturally have a 
“thicker” altitude span for the constellation (i.e., 
~200km).  
 
In summary, the three constellations analyzed in this 
paper provide a very representative sample of the 
types of operating satellite constellations that may 
populate LEO in the coming decades. We now turn to 
a balanced risk analysis of each of our representative 
constellations. Table 1, provided below, summarizes 
qualitatively some of the characteristics of the three 
constellations examined in this paper relative to each 
other. 
 
Now, we will develop relationships for collision risk 
that will be used to characterize risks related to these 
three constellations. 
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COLLISION RISK 
  
Risk to the debris environment from collisions is 
probability multiplied by consequence.  We will first 
examine probability and then consequence. The 
probability of collision for a satellite from the 
background debris hazard is given by: 
 
PC = 1 – exp(-SPD x VR x AC x T) 
 
Where  PC = probability of collision for T 
SPD = spatial density, number of debris per 
cubic kilometer 
VR = relative velocity, km/s (10km/s 
average in LEO) 
AC = areal/collision cross-section, km
2
 
T = time, seconds 
 
The full development for this expression is provided 
in Appendix A. While much focus is on the 
operational phase of a satellite’s orbital life, there is a 
significant phase on each side of operations, 
deployment and disposal, that are often overlooked. 
During both phases there may be a significant risk 
posed to or from these constellations. The higher the 
operational altitude, the more transit time and 
exposed area to the background population will 
accumulate during both deployment and disposal. In 
addition, for disposal it is very relevant how long the 
operators will maintain control of their satellites.  
 
More pointedly, if a retiring satellite is left to be 
removed by atmospheric drag (i.e., maneuver 
capability no longer functions) then these satellites 
would be unable to avoid collisions with trackable 
objects or direct reentry to an ocean (i.e., a sparsely 
populated area of the globe).   
 
Given that the primary variable in determining 
probability of collision is spatial density of existing 
resident space objects (such as debris fragments and 
derelict hardware) of an orbit, we must first examine 
the spatial density of orbits where Iridium, OneWeb, 
and Spire constellations (will) transit and reside.   
 
Background Spatial Density 
 
The figure below shows the deployment locations for 
each constellation overlaid on the spatial density 
curves as derived from NASA’s ORDEM 
engineering model provided by Mark Matney of 
NASA/ODPO. Throughout the analysis, we will be 
using the >1cm threshold to represent the lethal yet 
nontrackable (LNT) debris and the >10cm threshold 
to represent the cataloged population which is 
trackable and potentially avoidable, if a satellite has 
maneuver capabilities and successfully executes a 
maneuver.  
 
A 1cm impact would likely severely disrupt or 
terminate the operations of a functioning satellite 
while a trackable object (represented by the >10cm 
population) would likely not only terminate the 
mission of a functioning satellite but probably cause 
the satellite to completely fragment. 
Table 1. The three constellations being examined in this paper comprise three typical constellation types. 
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Figure 1. The locations of the three constellations 
are plotted on the spatial density curves for orbital 
debris in LEO. 
ERAU #1175  Page 4 of 15 
 
 
Probability of Collision 
 
The table below quantifies the probability of collision 
of each constellation during its respective 
deployment, operations, and disposal phases. 
 
Neither deployment nor disposal are relevant for the 
Spire constellation since these CubeSats operate 
where they are deployed and are removed from orbit 
via atmospheric drag. Both OneWeb and Iridium 
nominally will have their satellites deployed initially 
at ~500km but the deploy operations for Iridium 
satellites is much shorter due to the proximity of their 
lower operational altitude (~780km  vs ~1200km for 
OneWeb). 
 
For OneWeb, the current conops is that once the 
spacecraft is verified as sound, it will use its electric 
thruster to transit the most densely populated portion 
of LEO to achieve its ~1200km operational orbit in 
about six months. The intent of this deployment plan 
is to ensure that no satellites are dead on arrival 
(DOA) at 1200km where they would linger for over 
100 years. However, the transit does itself pose a 
non-trivial collision risk to the constellation, as seen 
in the table below.  
 
Assuming all goes to plan, this deployment transit 
poses little risk to other operational satellites since 
OneWeb has the capability to avoid cataloged 
objects. Of course, a disabled OneWeb satellite in 
any part of the transit then poses a background debris 
risk to other satellites in that orbit. This long transit 
does raise at least three questions: 
 
 
- If a OneWeb satellite and another operational 
satellite are warned of a potential close 
approach – who must move? Should the 
satellite whose orbits are being crossed have 
the “right of way” during OneWeb’s elective 
journey to 1200km? 
- Is the risk imposed by the OneWeb transit 
higher or lower than the risk of deploying a 
DOA satellite at 1200 km? And, to whom?  
- Is a DOA satellite lingering for a long period 
at 1200km safer or more risky than a DOA 
satellite lingering for a shorter period at 
500km?  
 
Iridium’s disposal plan is to lower the perigee of 10 
of its satellites to 600km then rely on atmospheric 
drag to de-orbit these satellites within 25 years and 
lower the perigee of its remaining satellites to 250km. 
[9] OneWeb’s disposal plan is to lower the perigee of 
its satellite’s orbit to 200km and de-orbit from that 
altitude, effectively transiting back through LEO, a 
process they estimate will take less than one year. 
[10]  
 
OneWeb hopes to maintain active control all the way 
to reentry minimizing the possibility of debris 
landing on populated areas. For Spire, the current 
concept of operations is to naturally decay from its 
operational orbits using atmospheric drag, thus its 
Table 2. Probability of collision values for all phases of the three constellations are detailed below. 
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Iridium 72 776 ± 6 
4m
2
  
560kg 
~300m
2
 
500km 
1mo 
4.4E-3 
[1.1E-4] 
0.07 
[1.8E-3] 
5-
15yr 
~0.4 
~0.05 
OneWeb 720 1200 ± 75 
3.5m
2 
 
150kg 
~2500m
2
 
500km 
6mos 
0.20 
[7.1E-3] 
0.15 
[4.8E-3] 
1 yr 
~0.30 
[1.4E-2] 
Spire 175 500 ± 100 
0.09m
2 
 
5kg 
~16m
2
 N/A 0 
3.2E-4 
[4.3E-5] 
~5yr 
~1.5E-3 
~2.0E-4 
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probability of collision for disposal is the same as for 
its operational phase.  
 
The PC/yr for operations for the total constellation 
for Iridium and OneWeb are within a factor of three; 
whereas Spire is orders of magnitude lower. Iridium 
is located in a more densely populated region but the 
OneWeb constellation has a greater aggregate cross-
sectional area. Iridium is clearly operating at an 
altitude that presents the highest probability of 
collision with regard to debris, partially due to an 
earlier Iridium collision. Interestingly, deployment of 
the OneWeb constellation over six months exposes it 
to greater PC than a full year of operations. Disposal 
of OneWeb satellites poses the greatest PC as their 
transit is twice as long (nominally) as deployment.  
 
The collision risk during operations will fluctuate for 
Spire based on the solar cycle while OneWeb’s 
collision risk should stay constant unless debris-
generating events happen near it. A large debris 
generating event at 1200km will materially change 
the orbital environment and increase the probability 
of collision for many decades because atmospheric 
drag at 1200km has little effect. We address the 
impact of this fratricidal case below.  
 
For Iridium and OneWeb, the PC with objects > 
10cm is listed in brackets. The number given 
represents probability based on raw calculations 
without regard to a satellite’s ability to maneuver to 
avoid these collisions. The actual probability of such 
satellites having a collision during their operational 
lifetime given their propulsive capabilities is one that 
should be studied in more depth. On the one hand, 
one would hope that given the ability to maneuver 
around trackable objects the collision probability 
should be lower than one derived solely from surface 
area and spatial density calculations.  
 
On the other hand, satellites cannot maneuver around 
LNT fragments which can disable them making them 
non-maneuverable. In addition, satellites that are put 
into disposal orbits cannot maneuver during the 
disposal portion of their orbital lifetimes, which for 
Iridium would be as long as its operating lifetime in 
some cases. Finally, Iridium 33 has shown that the 
probability of collision with trackable objects is 
certainly not zero. Given the PC/yr in Table 2, there 
is a 3.5% chance over 20 years a collision with a 
trackable object would occur. In fact, we know about 
one Iridium collision with a trackable object over the 
past twenty years given that they had about 70 
operational satellites implies a 1.4% probability of 
failure (i.e., 1/70 over 20 years). We discuss below 
some of the reasons why propulsion is no panacea 
under “Operational Risk”. This is certainly an area 
that requires more study as it is evident that much of 
the collision risk is due to human interactions and not 
purely based physics models. 
 
Consequence 
 
The table below provides an assessment of the 
consequence if a satellite of each of the 
representative constellations fragments completely 
due to an explosion or collision with a cataloged 
debris fragment (i.e., the amount of debris created is 
proportional to the mass of the respective satellite). 
For each event, there will be 1.5 trackable fragments 
per kg of mass of satellite and 15 LNT per kg of mass 
of satellite created. These fragments will largely be 
spread above and below the center of each 
constellation by 100km (so a total spread of 200km).  
The debris will reside more near the center of the 
resulting debris cluster: 40% of the fragments in the 
middle 50km and 75% within the middle 100km. The 
spatial density in the table above represents the 
middle 50km; the densest part of the resultant debris 
cluster. The last column depicts the contribution of 
this newly created debris relative to the existing 
debris population at the operational orbit of each of 
our constellations. For example, a value of 0.5 means 
that the spatial density would be increased by 50% if 
such a fragmentation took place. 
 
What can be seen from the above table is that for any 
one catastrophic collision of a satellite in one of the 
constellations studied in this paper, Spire’s LEMUR-
2 satellites have the least consequence relative to the 
debris environment (and its own orbit). A breakup in 
the Iridium constellation has the greatest effect (due 
Table 3. The consequence of a satellite fragmentation 
within each constellation is proportional to the mass 
of a member of each constellation. 
 
Fragments Spatial Density 
Relative to Debris 
Background at 
Operational Orbit 
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to the larger spacecraft). Adding the consequence of a 
certain number of catastrophic collisions within the 
various constellations back into the collision risk is 
helpful in understanding the consequence of 
catastrophic collisions within these constellations on 
themselves. It should be noted that Iridium is already 
at the worst possible altitude (partially due to a 
previous collision involving an Iridium satellite) and 
so a 53% increase from another Iridium collision is 
more significant than a 36% increase from a OneWeb 
collision. 
 
Another way to look at this this fratricide effect is to 
examine the ratio of the number of trackable debris 
fragments produced (shown above in Table 3) by the 
number of satellites in the constellation. The results 
of this are shown in Table 4 below highlighting that a 
destructive event is proportionally worse for the 
Iridium constellation and least impactful for the Spire 
constellation. 
 
PERSPECTIVE 
While the number of satellites in these constellations 
creates large aggregate areal and mass characteristics 
in comparison to even monolithic GEO satellites, 
there are existing groupings of abandoned resident 
space objects that are more troublesome to future 
debris growth than any of the three constellations 
reviewed.  
 
Three clusters of massive derelict objects will now be 
detailed and compared to the three constellations. 
Each cluster is named by the center altitude of each 
cluster (e.g., C850 is a cluster centered around 
850km). A cluster is defined as a set of space objects 
with identical inclinations and similar altitude. 
Empirical analyses have shown that the members of 
these clusters interact with each other more than 
modeled by the probability of collision equation 
presented earlier that is based on the kinetic theory of 
gases.[11] Note that each cluster is comprised of a set 
of rocket bodies (RB) and the payloads (PL) that the 
RBs deployed. 
  
Table 5 below provides some key characteristics of 
these three clusters relative to the three constellations 
being analyzed. Table 6 below provides the 
probability of collision values for the entire cluster or 
constellation. OneWeb and Iridium values are in 
brackets for the reasons discussed above.  
 
Tables 5 and 6 highlight the very probable large 
number of impacts from LNT over the long-term. 
These types of impacts will trigger anomalies to the 
operational spacecraft and bursts of small number of 
more LNT from non-debilitating impacts on 
constellation members but much more so from the 
clusters of massive derelicts. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparing the three constellations against three clusters of massive derelicts provides a perspective on 
the criticality of these disparate space hardware collections. 
 
Number of 
Objects 
Ave cross-
section (m2) / 
mass (kg) 
Total 
Area 
(m2) 
Total Mass 
(kg) 
Altitude 
Span 
(km) 
Annual Inter-
Cluster 
Collision 
Rate 
Cataloged (LNT) 
Fragments from 
Collision Event 
C
lu
st
er
 
C775 
89 
(45RB & 
44PL) 
RB: 14/1434 
PL: 6/800 
900 ~100,000 60 ~1/500 
~4,500 
(~45,000) 
C850 
36 
(18RB & 
18PL) 
RB: 44/8300 
PL: 8/3250 
936 ~208,000 45 ~1/1200 
~16,000 
(~160,000) 
C975 
286 
(144RB & 
142PL) 
RB: 14/1434 
PL: 6/800 
3,000 ~560,000 85 ~1/120 
~4,500 
(~45,000) 
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Iridium 72 4/560 300 ~40,000 6 N/A 
~1,600 
(~16,000) 
OneWeb 720 3.5/150 2,500 ~108,000 150 N/A 
~450 
(~4,500) 
Spire 175 0.09/5 16 875 200 N/A 
~14 
(~140) 
 
Table 4. A debris–generating event would be 
proportionally worse for the Iridium 
constellation and least impactful to the Spire 
constellation. 
 Trackable 
Fragments 
from 
Destruction 
of Member 
Members of 
the 
Constellation 
Ratio of 
Fragments 
Produced to 
Members of 
Constellation 
Iridium 840 72 ~12 
OneWeb 225 720 ~0.3 
Spire 7 175 ~0.04 
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It should be noted these three clusters amount to 
about 20% by mass and number of derelicts in LEO 
so this continual interaction may become relevant 
over the long-term as massive non-operational 
objects continuously create large numbers of more 
LNT. Don Kessler even raised this potential concern 
for a cascading of small, but destructive, debris to be 
more likely and more imminent than the classic 
Kessler Syndrome he has been known for. [12]  
 
Now for some perspective on consequence from 
Table 6. A collision in C850 will have the greatest 
consequence as the rocket bodies in C850 are SL-16s 
that have a mass of 8,300kg with a length of 11m and 
diameter of 3.9m. If two of these were to have a 
hypervelocity collision then about ~16,000 trackable 
fragments would be created. This would double the 
cataloged population in one instance. The payloads 
that occupy C850 with the 18 SL-16s have masses of 
3,250kg; a collision between them would also likely 
create ~16,000 large fragments..  
 
Alternatively, C975 has the greatest probability with 
nearly 300 derelict objects spanning only 85km. In 
addition, if a collision occurs in C975 or C850 the 
resulting debris will remain in orbit many decades 
while debris from C775 collisions will likely have 
significant wash out over a few decades. Collisions in 
C975, while not as severe as the C850 collisions, will 
still likely create about 4,500 trackable fragments. 
 
This would make it one of the top three breakups 
ever and there is a 1/120 chance (i.e., ~1%) each year 
of such an event occurring. The C850 inter-cluster 
annual collision rate is smaller but is still 1/1200 
(~0.1% per year). 
 
As discussed earlier, the effects of drag are critical in 
considering the lingering risk posed by debris 
production. The figure below shows how these 
regions of drag effects might influence risks and need 
for more regulations. The figure below plots perigee 
altitude (since that largely determines drag effects) 
versus inclination for all rocket bodies in the Satellite 
Catalog from late 2016; there were 968, many of 
which are in the three clusters examined in this paper. 
Spire is clearly in the high drag effect region (green 
tinting). Iridium and two of the clusters are in the 
intermediate drag effect zone (yellow tinting) where 
the primary drag effects will be felt during periods of 
high solar activity. OneWeb and the last cluster are in 
the low drag effect region (red tinting) where drag 
has very little cleansing effects except for the very 
smallest objects (e.g., less than 1cm).  
Table 6. The probability of collision calculations for each of the constellations and clusters highlights the 
enormity of both collections of space hardware. 
Red:~10-1 
Black: ~10-2 
Grey: <10-2 
Total Constellation/Cluster 
>1cm >10cm 
Name Altitude (km) 
SPD 
1cm 
SPD  
10cm 
PC 1yr PC 10yr 
PC 
20yr 
PC 1yr PC 10yr PC 20yr 
C775 775 8E-07 2E-08 0.2031 0.8967 0.9893 0.0057 0.0552 0.1073 
C850 850 1E-06 3E-08 0.2556 0.9478 0.9973 0.0088 0.0847 0.1623 
C975 975 3E-07 2E-08 0.2471 0.9415 0.9966 0.0187 0.1724 0.3151 
          
Iridium 776 8E-07 2E-08 0.0701 0.5164 0.7662 [0.0018] [0.0180] [0.0357] 
OneWeb 1200 2E-07 6E-09 0.1470 0.7960 0.9584 [0.0048] [0.0466] [0.0910] 
Spire 500 6E-08 8E-09 0.0003 0.0030 0.0059 0.000040 0.0004 0.0008 
 
 
Figure 2. Drag effects provide an important aspect of 
the space hardware residing in LEO. 
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It is quite haunting that an event that could double the 
catalog population has at least a 1/1200 chance of 
occurring annually (i.e., C850). Any of these inter-
cluster collisions would produce significant amounts 
of debris that would measurably affect satellites 
within ±100-150km. While OneWeb is largely above 
the fray from these events, they might be affected by 
collisions in C975 but Iridium is right in the middle 
of C775 and just below C850.  The figure below 
shows the three constellations and three clusters 
plotted on the same ORDEM-derived spatial density 
curves for LEO.  
 
The spatial density plot (number of objects of three 
size thresholds per volume plotted against altitude) 
shows that Spire and OneWeb have both selected 
altitudes for their constellations out of the most 
debris-populated regions of LEO. 
 
What may not be apparent, but is instructive to state 
explicitly, is that the clusters of massive derelicts 
have larger aggregate masses and collision cross-
sections than the three constellations yet these 
derelict objects have no means to detect or maneuver 
away from collisions like operational satellites. 
However, there is little attention being taken of these 
objects.  
 
So, one may ask, with constellation members with 
individual satellite masses orders of magnitude less 
than the abandoned rocket bodies and dead payloads 
in neighboring clusters plus likelihood of inter-
constellation collisions near zero, what should the 
aerospace community be focusing their attention on? 
 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
 
The debris environment places certain operational 
risks/burdens on operators and they, in turn, place 
certain operational risks/burdens on each other, 
including resource expenditures and risks of financial 
loss. Operationally, close approach analysis and 
mitigation poses a significant resource burden for 
maneuverable satellite systems and constellations. In 
scenarios where no maneuver is undertaken, there is 
still significant expenditures of labor due to the 
number of meetings, follow-on analysis and inter- 
and intra-operator coordination required. In some 
cases, these activities require an equivalent number 
of personnel necessary to support launch and early 
operations. In scenarios where a maneuver is 
undertaken, fuel is expended and useful life of the 
satellite asset is potentially cut short.  
 
In contrast, constellations that cannot maneuver are 
able to avoid much of the effort that comes along 
with close approach coordination, since their ability 
to mitigate the threat is based on atmospheric drag 
which costs nothing in terms of spent propellant and 
only minor disruptions to their operations. The 
challenge for future constellations (and those that 
regulate them) in increasingly crowded orbits is to 
find a workable set of customs and reliable set of 
tools that addresses close approach warnings as a 
routine and expected situation with delegated 
responsibilities tied to agreed-upon courses of action.  
 
First, there are a number of common misconceptions 
that will need to be understood for any meaningful 
traffic management framework to be implemented: 
(i) all close approaches are the same, (ii) information 
on close approaches is fairly accurate, and (iii) 
maneuvers can be executed perfectly and in a timely 
fashion and, thereby, eliminate the risk of collision. 
 
Misconception 1: All close approaches are the same. 
 
As a community, satellite operators do not do a good 
job of differentiating and detailing the differences 
between various potential collisions in terms of 
probabilities and consequences. A near collision 
involving two derelict rocket bodies is a completely 
different scenario from a close approach between two 
operational satellites, yet they may both be lumped 
into the same close approach bin. Papers that merely 
study number of close approaches, we feel miss the 
point. Specifically, hundreds of 1km close 
approaches pose much less risk then a single 100m 
conjunction.   
 
 
Figure 3. Depicting the cluster locations relative to 
the constellations shows how there may be a 
relationship between these two different types of 
space hardware. 
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As a satellite operator, all other resident space objects 
are effectively navigation hazards with variable and 
inconsistent knowledge of each hazard’s state. As 
illustrated above, the number of derelict vehicles and 
debris are more than an order of magnitude greater 
than the number of active operational satellites. 
Therefore, the odds are that close approaches will 
occur between an active satellite and components of 
the debris environment which are not capable of 
maneuvering (rather than a maneuverable satellite). 
Thus, space traffic management operator-to-operator 
procedures, while necessary, may not be relevant in a 
large majority of close approaches. Overly simple 
rules as what operators “must” do may not have any 
practical impact on most close approaches, while 
having large economic impacts on such operators. 
 
Misconception 2: Information on close approaches is 
fairly accurate. 
 
Three critical pieces of information regarding a close 
approach may be wrong or irrelevant.  
 
First, the knowledge of your own satellite’s position 
is usually accurate to less than 100m in LEO. 
Unfortunately, in most cases a radar-derived position 
of the owner operator satellite used to compute the 
close approach will never be as accurate as their own 
knowledge of their satellite. This may lead the 
operator to ignore an externally-derived close 
approach warning.  
 
Secondly and similarly, the knowledge of the 
conjuncting object’s state is important. It may either 
be static (i.e., from update to update it is unchanging) 
which leads to questions regarding the currency of 
the information. Alternatively, it may be highly 
variable with each update; this may be the result of 
the object’s high area-to-mass ratio or radar tasking 
inconsistencies.  
 
The third piece of information that results in a 
tendency to discount the close approach notification 
is the published covariance matrix for the offending 
object. The published uncertainty for the other object 
is often many orders of magnitude greater than the 
uncertainty for the state knowledge for the owner 
operator satellite. This lack of certainty in position 
knowledge may frustrate attempts to determine the 
best course of action and create discussions within an 
operator resulting in further analysis and expenses. In 
these typical cases, where there is a great disparity 
between the covariance between the two objects, 
statistics dictate that action is discouraged since the 
benefits are highly questionable. In some cases, 
executing a maneuver might be more likely to cause 
the collision you are trying to avoid versus just doing 
nothing. 
 
In fact the risk from information defects and 
modelling outcomes of maneuvers can be quantified 
for each of our constellations using the following 
criteria: (1) object altitude, (2) object status, (3) 
object attitude, and (4) propulsive capability.  
 
Vehicle altitude is a means to account for the 
predictability of the orbit and, therefore, the 
consistency and quality of the resulting trajectory 
solution. Objects above 800km are not affected 
significantly by atmospheric drag and are simpler to 
track and maintain precision orbital solutions, while 
objects below 600km are significantly perturbed by 
atmospheric drag and require near persistence 
monitoring to provide accurate information regarding 
their trajectory. Resident Space Objects (RSO) 
between 600 and 800km orbit are in a more benign 
atmospheric environment with nearly linear decay 
rates of years and are heavily influenced by solar 
activity.  
 
The object’s status (i.e., either operational or derelict) 
is a significant aspect in its risk assessment. An 
 
Figure 4. Conjunction characterization is very 
complicated due to lack of knowledge and natural 
variability of orbital data. 
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active vehicle with a functioning transponder or 
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver will have a 
more accurate ephemeris than a non-operational 
vehicle at the same altitude. Again, the number of 
active satellites is small compared to the debris 
population, but this factor in and of itself has a large 
effect on the risk assessment. 
 
The object’s attitude (e.g., tumbling, nadir pointing) 
also plays an important role. Predicting the motion of 
an inactive tumbling object is challenging below 
450km due to the differential drag forces acting on 
the satellite as opposed to a 3-axis-stabilized satellite 
with a near constant cross-sectional area exposed to 
the ram direction. This risk factor is a measure of the 
solution’s stability and ability to provide long-term 
insight into how the object’s trajectory will evolve. 
When modeling an intact unknown object, a 
reasonable starting point for its area-to-mass ratio is 
0.01 m
2
/kg. This ratio holds for 3U CubeSats up to 
2,000kg satellites. Many spacecraft have 
approximately the same area-to-mass ratio due to 
common space system reliance on solar panels for 
power generation and the density with which 
electronics and components can be packed. 
 
The final factor is whether the system has or had a 
propulsion system. As discussed above, the ability to 
maneuver is not a panacea for negating the risk of 
collision. Propulsion systems provide a course of 
action with additional independent risks that need to 
be assessed.  
 
This risk assessment approach provides a first order 
metric regarding the complexity of the encounter, the 
amount of tracking required and, more importantly, 
the timeline available to resolve. Using this approach, 
the most benign object on this scale is a stable low 
area-to-mass ratio, active satellite above 1100km and 
the most difficult to model object is an active 
unstable satellite with propulsion orbiting between 
200-450 km. The low LEO active satellite that is 
unstable, encountering faults and anomalies pose a 
greater risk to effective maneuvers due to its rapid 
decay rates and the potential for an off-nominal 
maneuver. However, this risk is largely offset by the 
shorter orbital lifetimes of these low-LEO payloads.   
 
Misconception 3: Maneuvers can be executed 
perfectly and in a timely fashion and, thereby, reduce 
the risk of collision. 
 
Maneuvers are usually complicated events that 
require planning, potentially heaters to be warmed, 
and uploading commands to the vehicle to execute 
the burn. All of this takes time, and in the case where 
there is sufficient time, this can be worked out to 
decrease the probability of collision, but not erase it 
or the consequences of an impact. In addition, most 
maneuvers are asynchronous events planned in 
advance for stationkeeping or orbit maintenance. 
Even in these benign cases, something may go awry 
or end up off nominal. Since fuel is usually the 
critical life-limiting quantity on a satellite, the usual 
maneuver strategy is to plan for 80% of the 
correction in the first maneuver with a subsequent 
maneuver for fine tuning. This conservative approach 
(from a fuel management perspective) may not be the 
optimal approach from a collision avoidance 
perspective.  
 
Given these constraints on the system, the chance that 
a mostly correct maneuver will avoid an object with a 
significant uncertainty in its state is a challenging 
task. However, the advent of electric thrusters 
provides some extra flexibility and capability in this 
regard. Additionally, the chance for operator error or 
a system fault is non-zero and is usually not included 
in the calculus to select the most prudent course of 
action. It cannot be overstated that the Cosmos-
Iridium collision of 2009 was enabled by a planned 
and ostensibly safe maneuver. This is especially true 
for CubeSats; while it may seem logical that 
CubeSats present less risk to others if they have a 
propulsive capability (and thus the ability to avoid a 
collision), many familiar with typical CubeSat 
operators have posited that giving a novice space 
operator this added capability might actually backfire 
from a collision probability perspective. 
 
It is clear that operational risk are burdens imposed 
by the debris environment on constellations and by 
constellations on themselves and other operators.  In 
addition, these risks raise complicated issues for 
space traffic management that simple rules (everyone 
carry insurance, everyone carry propulsion, etc.) 
cannot solve. For instance, there is zero chance for 
Spire to impose a risk of loss on Iridium given the 
different altitudes they inhabit. However, there is a 
risk for Iridium to impose a loss on Spire given that it 
intends to put the Iridium satellites into a disposal 
orbit that intersects with Spire’s. Should Iridium have 
to buy insurance in favor of Spire? Similarly, 
OneWeb plans to transit orbits used by Iridium. If an 
Iridium and OneWeb satellite collide, whose fault is 
it? Who needs to move in case of a conjunction 
event? Do these maneuvers require a set of rules 
ahead of time?  
 
What about debris caused by a satellite’s destruction, 
say Iridium-33, which pollutes the orbits of other 
operators and necessitates many maneuvers a year? Is 
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it Iridium’s “fault” that a OneWeb satellite is hit by 
debris from the Iridium-33 collision event when 
transiting that altitude? Should Iridium’s insurance 
have to cover that eventuality especially given that 
OneWeb is choosing to transit Iridium’s orbits? We 
do not necessarily have answers to these questions, 
but believe the complexity involved counsels 
strongly against overly simplistic and inflexible rules. 
 
NON-ADHERENCE RISK 
 
Non-adherence risk is the risk that an operator cannot 
or does not comply with rules and regulations in 
place to minimize debris generation. Currently, this 
refers to the 25-year de-orbit guideline and 
minimization of debris directive set out in the IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines  (advocated by 
several international entities) and in various national 
requirements or customs that derive therefrom. The 
25-year de-orbit guideline states that an object 
passing through LEO should de-orbit within 25 years 
of mission completion. Adherence to the existing 25-
year guideline has been much less than expected as 
can be seen in Figure 5, inserted below.  
 
We think considering non-adherence risk is relevant, 
because non-adherence has a large impact on other 
risks and regulators should consider the risk of non-
adherence with any rule or system they adopt. The 
Traffic Management Study found that CubeSats that 
are launched into lower LEO orbits (and thereby 
follow the 25-year guideline) do not significantly 
raise the risk of collision in LEO. [13] Other studies 
have found that CubeSats without propulsion systems 
launched into high LEO orbits (and thereby violate 
the 25-year guideline) do significantly raise the 
amount of debris in LEO over extended periods. [14] 
Given the comparable area-to-mass ratio of larger 
satellites, we see no reason why non-adherence to the 
25-year guideline is not equally or more concerning 
for large satellites, especially since by definition they 
would result in more derelict mass abandoned on 
orbit.  
 
This non-adherence comes in three basic forms: (i) 
permitted non-adherence, (ii) technical non-
adherence, and (iii) willful non-adherence.   
 
Permitted non-adherence can occur when a 
jurisdiction does not have any orbital debris rules or 
allows an operator to obtain a waiver of those rules 
(either prospectively or retroactively). Given that 
background guidelines are from the United Nations 
and IADC, some countries are more committed to 
meeting them than others. New rules must apply and 
be enforced internationally in order to prevent the 
effective arbitraging of regulatory regimes. 
 
Technical non-adherence occurs when a satellite 
cannot adhere to established rules. For instance, when 
a given satellite is deployed in a dead on arrival state 
or when a given satellite is disabled by background 
debris, as described previously or otherwise fails on 
orbit. 
 
Willful non-adherence occurs when an operator 
violates the orbital debris mitigation requirements to 
which it is subject in a voluntary way, in other words, 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Debris mitigation compliance has not been very good over the last 15 years.  Source: Journée de 
Synthèse Débris, Review of Mitigation Rules Compliance in LEO (2000-2014) (June 9, 2015). FSOA is the 
French Space Operations Act. 
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is able to comply but does not. This might occur 
when end of life maneuvers do not result in an orbit 
that meets the 25-year guideline or such maneuvers 
are not performed before such time as fuel is 
inadequate to complete them. Given that it is 
impossible to distinguish between willful and 
technical non-adherence without evidence available 
only from the operator or following a government 
investigation, we are making no claims or 
implications in this paper that anyone has willfully 
violated the 25-year guideline or their orbital debris 
mitigation plans. However, we do note, as a general 
matter, that there is a huge economic incentive to 
keep a high value asset operating as long as possible 
in orbit and that systems fail in unexpected ways and 
at unexpected times leading to at least technical non-
adherence in many cases.    
 
We now examine all three of our constellations 
through the lens of “non-adherence risk”. 
 
Iridium is the only constellation examined with an 
operational  track record which can be evaluated. 
While Iridium was launched before the 25-year 
guideline was implemented (in fact its constellation is 
subject to much more stringent requirements), 
Iridium has asked the FCC for the newer less 
stringent 25-year guideline to apply. This is an 
example of permitted non-adherence (a waiver of 
stricter existing requirements), although the FCC 
should be commended for only waiving in part the 
more stringent rules to which Iridium was originally 
subject. [16]   
 
In terms of technical non-adherence, Iridium inhabits 
an altitude where a satellite dead on arrival, disabled 
by background debris, and/or running out of fuel will 
not de-orbit for 200 years. In addition, Iridium 
satellites must continue to function and preserve 
enough fuel to complete their end of life maneuvers. 
In fact, their plan states specifically that “satellite 
disposal is predicated on the end-of-life satellite 
retaining sufficient functionality to accomplish the 
disposal maneuver sequence.” [15] Therefore, 
technical non-adherence risk is high for Iridium.    
 
This is shown by actual experience as documented in 
Figure 6 below which plots operational altitudes of 
Iridium satellites over time. This chart shows that at 
least two of Iridium satellites have failed to execute 
on their deorbit plans out of 11 end-of-life satellites 
by 2015 (or 19% non-compliance). [17] Still this 
record is better than the average compliance as 
shown in Figure 5, at least so far. 
 
Turning to OneWeb, there is no history of permitted 
non-adherence, as OneWeb has not asked for any 
exemptions from the 25-year guideline. In fact, 
OneWeb’s disposal plan appears to be far better than 
the 25-year guideline. In addition, OneWeb’s 
deployment plan has satellites deploying at 500 km, 
where they would still meet the 25-year guideline in a 
 
 
Figure 6. Iridium’s track history of deorbiting old satellites is better than the industry average and may improve 
as they respond to the next generation satellites being deployed to upgrade their constellation.  
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dead on arrival scenario, which mitigates technical 
non-adherence risk in the deployment phase.  
However, there remains the possibility of a OneWeb 
satellite being disabled at its operational altitude and 
thus not de-orbiting for hundreds of years. As 
discussed previously, there is also risk inherent in 
OneWeb’s transit through LEO which should be 
carefully weighed against the risk of a dead on arrival 
satellite at OneWeb’s operational orbit. This risk can 
best be mitigated by higher reliability systems.  
 
Spire’s LEMUR-2 constellation is purposefully 
deployed into altitudes that will meet the 25-year 
guideline under a worst case dead on arrival scenario. 
[18] Spire is relying on physics to meet the guideline.  
 
While popular consensus is that CubeSats are largely 
non-compliant to debris mitigation guidelines, Figure 
5 actually noted the large increase in compliance with 
the 25-year guideline in 2014 when CubeSats were 
first considered. Compliance jumped from 60% to 
over 80% when CubeSats were considered. Given 
that compliance was in the range of 50-70% before 
CubeSats, sensational news stories that 1 in 5 
CubeSats violates the 25-year guidelines (20%) 
actually demonstrates a higher level of compliance 
than the baseline for other satellites. [19] Still, we 
believe this is not sufficient. 
 
We do not mean to argue that the 25-year guideline is 
the answer in and of itself.  In fact, we will discuss 
shortly why such an overly simplistic rule makes less 
sense for such a complicated problem like orbital 
debris.  We merely hope to highlight that risk of non-
adherence to whatever set of rules and regulations is 
eventually adopted has a meaningful impact on the 
debris environment.  This risk, can of course, be 
mitigated by technical or physical controls that are 
designed to meet the requirement on a consistent and 
high fidelity basis. However, it seems clear that 
“voluntary” compliance has not been successful to 
date in guaranteeing a high level of compliance from 
any one type of system.  
 
SUMMARY 
With this paper we hope to have highlighted a few 
key considerations with respect to the orbital debris 
environment. First, the debris environment in low 
earth orbit is highly complex. Different orbits have 
different physics characteristics (spatial density, 
atmospheric drag, perturbations, etc.) that are critical 
to any risk analysis. Second, satellite operators have 
different characteristics that drive the risk their 
satellites pose and face from the debris environment, 
including different deployment and disposal plans 
and different satellite bus characteristics. These 
complexities require well thought out rules based on 
physics. It is likely that a “one size fits all orbits” or a 
“one size fits all operators” rule or rules “will no 
doubt create economic consequences, while 
potentially not mitigating safety risks significantly.” 
[20]    
Next, the risk a collision poses to the orbital 
environment is probability times consequence, not 
just probability. In addition, risk is certainly not 
number of satellites or close approaches. Let’s be 
more precise and start measuring collision risk in a 
meaningful way. We should also keep the risks posed 
by and to economically useful constellations in 
perspective. At 775km, 850km, and 975km there are 
concentration points where the background 
environment is on the precipice of debris-generating 
events that will exacerbate an already tenuous 
situation in LEO. One collision within the C850 
cluster will create 16,000 trackable fragments while 
one collision between two CubeSats will create 14 
trackable fragments. As much (if not even more) time 
and effort should be spent on solving the issue of 
massive derelicts as regulating constellations.  
In addition, given the true state of affairs when it 
comes to the complexity of close approach 
avoidance, coordination among constellation 
operators is necessary. It is proposed that close 
coordination between operators is a far more efficient 
and effective means of collision avoidance than rigid 
rules and customs imposed by a “celestial arbitrator.” 
Close approaches in low earth orbit are not a simple 
highway (or even air traffic) management problem. 
Orbital collision avoidance will require a highly 
complex series of mutually interdependent actions 
based on an imperfect understanding of initial states 
and executed from hundreds to thousands of 
kilometers away. We posit that the ability to 
maneuver is an added dimension that requires proper 
assessment from timelines to execution success 
versus a panacea for mitigating all potential 
collisions.  
Next, assuming the world can come up with a set of 
rules or guidelines that will ensure that orbital debris 
does not get out of control, regulators should create 
workable mechanisms to ensure compliance by their 
operators. 
Finally, LEO has limited volume and, as such, debris 
generation needs to be managed carefully. However, 
while current debris mitigation guidelines (and even 
the debate over debris remediation efforts) rest on the 
impetus to prevent a long-term cascading effect of 
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orbital collisions (i.e., the Kessler Syndrome), rules 
and frameworks should focus on current and near 
term space flight safety. The orbital debris 
environment does not have to be preserved now for 
the next 200 years, it needs to be preserved now for 
the next 10-20 years and then rules and frameworks 
need to be adapted to the new facts and 
circumstances that exist at that later date. 
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APPENDIX A. Technical Description of the Poisson 
Distribution Applied to Orbital Debris Encounters 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that the Poisson 
probability is an underestimation, empirical 
encounter rates (ER) were calculated at various miss 
distances (from 500m-5km in 500m intervals) and 
compared to a Poisson distribution. The empirical 
ERs were calculated from JSpOC data gathered from 
May 2015-May 2016 and encounter statistics created 
by Integrity Applications Incorporated (IAI) for this 
same timeframe.  These were then compared to the 
ER found using equations (1-4) where ʎ is the 
frequency within the Poisson probability density 
function (i.e., P(k)) taken from the kinetic theory of 
gases analogy. 
 
𝜆 = 𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝐷       (1) 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  
     𝑆𝑃𝐷 =
𝑁
𝑉𝑜𝑙
 = spatial density, #/km
3
  
     N = number of derelicts, 
    Vol = volume swept out by cluster, km
3
 
    AC = collision cross section, km
2
 
    VR = relative velocity, km/s   
  
       𝑃(𝑘) =  
𝜆𝑘𝑒−𝜆
𝑘!
  (2) 
where        
      λ = expected number of occurrences over time, t 
      k = number of occurrences (k = 0,1...) 
 
When it is assumed that there will be very few 
events, the probability of that rare event can be 
determined by 1 (i.e., the total all possible 
occurrences) minus the probability of no events. The 
result is represented by the well-known expression in 
equation (3). 
 
𝑃(1) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡   (3) 
 
The PC is the collision hazard to one satellite from N 
objects in the population. When we are looking at PC 
we are only concerned about the target, e.g., 
operational satellite getting hit by cataloged debris. 
Conversely, when we have a cluster of massive 
derelicts we are concerned about collisions between 
any two of the N objects in the cluster.  
 
This is called the collision rate (CR) and is the 
cumulative PC for N objects on each other.  
 
 
 
 
 
CR is represented by: 
 
CR =  ∑ 𝑃𝐶 = (
1
2
) 𝑁 𝑁1 (𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝐷 * T) (4)
 1
 
      = (N
2
/2) * (𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑅 ∗ T) / (Vol) 
 
When the encounter dimension is considered to be 
half of the miss distance then the collision rate is 
equivalent to the encounter rate (ER). 
 
The next logical question is “if we accept the 
probability found with a Poisson distribution, when 
might the first collision occur?” Using a gamma 
distribution this can be evaluated for a given 
confidence level in equation (5). 
 
𝛤 = − 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝐶) ∗ (
1
𝐶𝑅
) (5) 
 
where Γ is the number of years until the first event 
 C is the confidence interval  
 CR is Poisson-derived encounter rate   
 
The table to the right shows the number of years for 
the first Poisson event predicted by the gamma 
distribution at different confidence levels for a CR of 
1/3045. Please note that we have already shown that 
the Poisson distribution may underestimate the actual 
physical encounter rate so these may overestimate the 
time until the first collision event. Using the 
empirically-derived collision rate of 1/2500, the first 
Poisson event would occur within 25yrs with a 1% 
confidence. Note that the SL-16 cluster has been 
intact since 2007, so the “clock started ticking ten 
years ago.”  
 
                                                     
1
 Note that the ½ term appears to insure that we do 
not double count possible encounters within the 
cluster. 
Confidence Years Before First Event 
1% 31 
5% 156 
10% 321 
25% 876 
50% 2110 
75% 4221 
90% 7011 
